As philosophy encourages deep thinking about the meaning of life, one can hardly escape the serious issue concerning God. Belief in God in some form or fashion is almost universal. There have never been any truly atheistic cultures. There have been many religious cultures of different kinds. This is not to say that all of them are good and without problems. Religion per se is not all good. Many evil things have been done in the name of God as well as science, custom, or whatever. Any argument for the value of religion or God is not an argument for vindicating the excesses done in the name of God or religion. But philosophy does not begin with the many beliefs as diverse as they are. Philosophy is more concerned with the reasons for the beliefs rather than a description of the beliefs. Philosophy raises the pertinent question: is there any justification for believing in God? Our primary concern in this chapter is just that question. In ancient times few people doubted the existence of God. In modern times many people do. We will seek to cover the reasons given for belief in God as well as the arguments used against that belief.
We must, first, define a few words. The first one is God. Theos, a Greek word has come to mean a Being who is personal, intelligent, able to achieve his purpose, who is also Creator and Redeemer. Belief in this kind of Being is called theism. Theism is opposed to atheism which is the belief that God does not exist at all. Agnosticism is another Greek word that assumes a position of not being able to know any way or the other. Theism must not be confused with pantheism either. Pantheism is the idea that God is all and all is God. A general tendency of pantheism is to draw some analogy of comparison between the soul and the body of man. The soul is in the body, and similarly, God is the soul of the body of the world. Pantheism doesn't really mean anything different from the world. Pantheism substitutes a spiritual determinism for a materialistic determinism. There is no real problem of knowledge of God in pantheism, in one sense, for in knowing the world and oneself, one has a knowledge of pantheism. Moreover, pantheism is not usually intelligent.
occurs solely within the living fragment of itself--man.
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), French genius in physics, mathematics, philosophy and theology, was born in Clermont. In philosophy and theology he is better known for the Pensees, which were fragments or scraps of paper on which he had written thoughts about religion. The Wager is one of these ideas or Pensees, published after he died.
Our questions about God then become this: what evidence or reason is there to believe that there exists an intelligent being who is not identified with the material world? Is there a Transcendent Being? Why has man come to believe in such a Being?
There are some answers given to this that relate to man's early belief in God. Some psychiatrists have argued that belief in God or gods is a projection of man's fears. Primitive man was driven by fears and the idea of worshipping some unknown being occurred to him to allay these fears.
Immediately, one can see some problems. First, unlike people of modern historical times, we have no documents to warrant such retrospective psychic examination. One may analyze a person like Luther through his writings, and make some sense, but not pre-historic man. Second, primitive people were generally considered ignorant, but the worship of any god is a fairly sophisticated idea and hidden or invisible beings are not easy to assume. Third, in this practice one is taking modern twentieth century reactions and evaluations and imposing them on a culture which is very little known.
Various other theories are available for consideration such as religion arising in despair of magic or belief in God arose as primitives attempted to explain the unexplainable. Welhelm Schmidt has proposed that belief in God arose because man once knew God and this knowledge was subsequently corrupted by adaptations to changing cultures, levels of commitment and degeneration. Schmidt has received a mixed reception among scholars in the area. His view has many commendable features, but as far as the pre-historical religion goes, we must admit that "we know, in fact, nothing certain about the origin of religion and its primitive stages."1 Regardless of how belief in God arose, the question facing us now is: what is the basis for belief in God to continue? Here one sits in the contemporary world. Here is the world one sees--people, things, ideas. But God cannot be seen. There are two options about God. Either God is hidden or he is not. If he is hidden, what is there today that compels a belief in his existence? The answers to this question may be placed under three headings: (l) natural theology, (2) experiential-pragmatic examples, and (3) revelation. The first two answers fit more closely into philosophy, and the third answer involves religion.
I. Natural Theology.
Is it possible to learn anything about a Transcendent Being from nature itself? Does nature itself, as I examine it, lead me to the conclusion that a God exists? Natural theology sums up the conclusions that one learns from nature. There is a long tradition of philosophers who have believed that natural theology is meaningful. The Catholic tradition from Aquinas in the 13th century A.D. to the present has been the most forceful. Those who argue negatively, that is, there is no knowledge of God possible from nature are of several varieties. Atheists certainly fit into this category. But there are people who believe in God but who do not accept the arguments from nature about God's existence. Immanuel Kant rejected a number of arguments based on nature, but presented a moral argument for God's existence. Some Protestant theologians, John Baillie and Karl Barth along with the American philosopher Gordon H. Clark, fit into this category of rejecting the use of the arguments. All of these affirm a strong belief in God on other than arguments drawn from the facts of nature.
The strongest arguments against belief in God have, of course, come from the atheistic camp, and those generally critical of religious belief as in the example of David Hume. We will now turn to sketch the arguments drawn from observations about nature.
A. Cosmological Arguments.
The arguments we will use are drawn from Thomas Aquinas who adapted them from Aristotle. They will need some adaptation for modern use. There are three variations on the argument.
(1) The argument from motion.
Aquinas wrote:
The second question, why stop the motion series with God? is more crucial. The atheist wants to stop with the motion seen in the world without seeking a first mover. He argues that the argument is contradicted by demanding a first mover. He seems willing to accept motion without an explanation that is eternal, and different from the things in motion. In doing so the atheist must conclude that the world is eternal itself. Matter does exist and needs no explanation beyond itself. But Aquinas accepted the argument that something is eternal. What is it? God or matter? Again, appealing to the Big Bang theory we can say that matter as we know it is not eternal.
(2) The second argument is called the argument from efficient causes. Aquinas wrote:
(3) The third argument is called the argument from contingency. Aquinas wrote:
The argument cannot simply stop with a necessary being, either mind or matter, but must involve the aesthetic aspect of the question: did matter produce mind, or mind produce matter? Evolutionary theory is used often to support the priority of matter over mind. But this poses the cosmic question of the origin of life from non-life. Matter as we define it now and know it scientifically is not creative. Mind is creative, but we know it only experientially from the vantage point of a body. Even then there is yet the mystery of how a mind initiates and brings action through a body. Does our argument make more sense if we conclude for a Being who is Mind and who creates, or a Being that is matter and un-creative? Mind must be the more aesthetically satisfying conclusions.
B. Teleological Argument.
The teleological argument is the most popularly known of the arguments, but apparently not the most important one with Aquinas. The argument is known as the argument from design, or argument to a designer. About it Aquinas wrote:
The macrocosm is used also to illustrate the seeming designed aspect of man's existence. Spaceship earth appears more and more unique and precarious as we explore space. We have an atmosphere that precludes our being bombed by meteorites. Thinner air would not burn out meteors before they hit the earth. Our rotation on the earth is such that we have liveable temperatures. Slower rotations would alternately freeze us at night and burn us in the day. Our position in reference to the sun is such that we have enough heat but not overheat, and the same is true with cold. Other features could be used in illustration of this idea of design in macrocosm.
The basic conclusion is that a designer brought this into being, and in Aquinas' words, this being is God.
We must now look at the criticisms of the argument to a designer. The most perceptive critic of the argument in the history of philosophy is David Hume, in the eighteenth century. Anthony Flew follows much of Hume's thought in the twentieth century. Hume raised the following objections.
(1) An infinite designer cannot be concluded from a finite design. To put it another way, "Similar causes prove similar effects and similar effects similar causes."8 The intent of the criticism is well-taken, but there is a sense in which the precept could be modified in terms of modern physics. The principle concerning the loss of energy in nature would require a greater cause to achieve the lesser effect. Such a conclusion would require a greater being to create the world than the effects, but even this would not require an infinite God. In fairness, however, to Aquinas, the argument only speaks of God whose infinity is not learned from this argument as from the third argument, and then it would be possible to appeal to God's self-revelation for the idea of infinity. Even Hume admits that the argument may give basis for concluding for a being who has a certain measure of power and intelligence.
(2) The second objection--Hume argued that the world may be compared more truly to a vegetable or animal rather than a watch or a machine.9 Regardless of either of these models, they all indicate design. If the world is a vegetable, it is an unusual vegetable that has design manifested in its being. The same would hold true for an animal. There is nothing sacred and necessary about the analogy of a machine. The makeup of both animal and vegetable is both complex and genetically designed. Neither of these models serves to get to an infinite or eternal solution if our physics concerning the origin of the earth is at all meaningful. Hume's analogies in his objection are outdated.
(3) Hume rejected the idea of a necessary existent. "There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it."10 Speaking of the being of anything as a general term, there is the absolute necessity of conceiving something as necessary. Actually, there are two necessities. First, from Hume's vantage there is the necessity of a necessary material world. This is Hume's alternative to a necessary God. But even the world is not the only necessary if we rule out a Creator. There is, a more fundamental necessary that we cannot escape. We must conceive of the necessity of space. We can--granting our existence somehow--conceive of empty space without anything in it. We cannot conceive of absolute nothing--no-thing. Space is necessary. If space is necessary, why should it be unreasonable to think of God as necessary since matter as we think of it has a beginning. Actually Hume does not really base his entire case on this as he claimed. The real issues are that God cannot be seen, and the problem of evil. We will speak of these shortly. If my observations about space are correct, then Hume's comments about a necessary existence as having no meaning are nonsense.11
(4) The real heart of Hume's objection concerns the matter of chaos in a designed world. To put in another way, if this is a designed world, why do people suffer? Hume appealed to Epicurus' old question and regarded it as unsolved. Summing up Epicurus, Hume wrote about evil and God:
This raises the question about the nature of the goodness of God. If God did judge as Hume requests, would God still be good? Presumably a God who judged would be bad. Either way God cannot win, and Hume cannot lose.
Is the goodness of God in his patience or in his swift judgement? Anthony Flew used this analogy of a father and insisted that a father would do things that God doesn't do. A father would heal his child who is sick and God as father does not. This story is touching and indicting, but there are other stories that suggest a hands-off situation more profound. A father loves his son, but for the son's growing up he gives him more and more freedom to make mistakes for the son must be on his own. The growing freedom may involve hurt and even the risk of death and self-destruction, but a true father gives the son the freedom to be himself. It may even be the choice of the son to involve himself in activities that mean certain death. The protest of the father is of no avail. One may lock up a drug addict son and seek to return him to normalcy, but as soon as the son is out he defies everyone who cares for him and returns to his destructive activities. The father loves and seeks to help, but the son will have nothing of it. God is like this also and there is a true expression of "tough-love" in the earthly as well as the heavenly father. The father is happy when the son follows the path of goodness, righteousness and fellowship with him. The human father also grieves when his son goes wrong. Can the father meaningfully force the son to his ways? Obviously he has the power to do it--certainly God does--but will he use it? Really?
The problem of evil will not be solved in a syllogistic fashion as created by Hume or Brightman. It is too complex and difficult. Their options as proposed are not the correct options. They are only traps. Any formulations of the problem will have to consider God's patience, man's freedom, and the wisdom of not using power or force.
A few miscellaneous comments are in order concerning other issues in Hume and Flew. One basic underlying issue is that God is not seen. Given the grudging admission of Hume "that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence"14 we still do not see this being, only the effects of such a one. This is not enough to erect anything on. It has no comparison to the matters of verification as in science.15 Flew's formulation of the issue of God abounds in some unusual and unnecessary formulations which call forth unnecessary demands, and then just simple abuse against his opponents. Some examples may help. Flew seeks to define God as creator in a way that man has no freedom of will.16 He defined God as omnipotent with the implication that man has no freedom and the logical necessity that the problem of evil must be whipped. It is true that he quoted several creeds for support, but the idea of omnipotence is not necessarily true for Christian theology. More appropriately, God is able to achieve his will and purpose which permits freedom, evil, as well as redemption.
Another problem in Flew is his use of the term "universe" in which he wants to see a God who is outside of the universe. What does the universe mean? Is not Flew asking for a view of another universe. Is this required in any theology? A transcendent God is not outside the universe, but only He is not identified with any material of it. God is not the earth or sun, or the stars, although theism believes that he created them. God must be within the confines of space and in that sense God is not outside of the universe, but within it. While I might argue for the existence of God I would not want to define Him as being outside the universe as I understand the term. Another example of the abuse--not logic--of Flew is seen in his comment that Roman Catholics have more juvenile delinquents than anyone else.17
We will return to Flew when we consider other types of arguments, but we need to make a general comment or two about the nature of arguments for God's existence. Arguments for the existence of God are probability arguments, that is, the probability is that a being or God of some kind exists. All arguments are probability arguments and that is as far as the argument can go.18 They are not sufficient for religious experience. The arguments without anything else would offer a very impoverished theology. Next, there are other people who reject the arguments because of the nature of their own philosophical systems. Kant is an example of this. Without going into his philosophy here, a comment of James Collins may be appropriate:
Another observation about the proofs is that one may make certain demands that would rule out the arguments. If one requires that God be seen as in the science lab, then the arguments do not give us that possibility. Last, the arguments need closer relationships to what we know presently about the nature of the world. With that we will turn to the last of the rational arguments.
C. The Ontological Argument.
This is the only rational argument that exists--that is, it does not begin with the visible world, but with a rational idea. Formulated by Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) the argument can be summarized in a simple sentence: "There is that than which a greater cannot be conceived."20 Three simple statements indicate the scope of the argument:
Man has an idea of a perfect being.
Existence is an attribute of perfection
Therefore, a perfect being must exist.
It is in this form that the argument has been most widely attacked. Not only in Anselm's day but Aquinas and Kant rejected the argument because existence is not an attribute of perfection. An idea of a perfect 100 dollar bill in your wallet does not bring it into existence. Because of this fallacy, it is generally concluded that the ontological argument is of little value.
However, a defense of the argument has been made by Norman Malcolm. He argued that there are two arguments in Anselm. The first form of the argument is that rejected by Aquinas and others. The second form involved the phrase "necessary existence as a perfection." Thus, a necessary being is greater than if it does not necessarily exist. Within the definition of God as eternal, one logically sees the necessity of his being. Malcolm summarized the argument as follows:
II. Experiential-Pragmatic.
The title of this sub-division is designed to cover several types that have little in common except they relate to man's personal experience, need, or practice. Beyond that the title serves no purpose other than as an organizing device. The first argument is the moral argument.
A. Moral Argument.
As noted above, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) rejected the arguments of both Aquinas and Anselm, but he believed in God and did not wish to give up the idea of a Supreme Being. In his Critique of Practical Reason, he formulated two arguments that are similar. The first argument concerns the immortality of the soul which cannot be proven at all, but is, for Kant, a necessary idea. The argument is summed as follows: Man lives under a moral law which requires perfection. Since man does not achieve it in this life, immortality is required that the duty of man may be fulfilled in meeting the demands of the moral law.23 Some practical questions may be raised about Kant's first argument. First, there is no visible moral law in nature and it may seem arbitrary to speak of one as Kant did. Second, why should man be given time to make up his failure? Without some Christian understanding of life after death, why postulate man's survival at all? Third, why not let the judgement about man's failure stand and simply say that he lost out in the race? Fourth, Kant ruled out forgiveness and grace and places life after death on performance which is contrary to Christian values.
The second argument may be summed as follows: Happiness should coincide with the degree of morality. Unfortunately it doesn't, yet man has a duty of pursuing the good. Then Kant said:
Another example of the moral argument is that of Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) who drew on the idea of a standard of truth in all disciplines. Even though a discipline is floundering around in half-truths, there is an ideal to which it hopes to attain in truth. Rashdall argued that:
The success of Rashdall's argument does not depend upon whether people follow a moral standard or not. Obviously many do not.
B. The Argument from Personal Experience.
This argument builds on the fact that religious experience is well-nigh universal. Elton Trueblood wrote:
If the argument is to be defended it might be supplemented with a detailed anthropological study as seen in Schmidt's "High God" idea in which the different religions could be traced to a common source of the idea of God. Perhaps then the argument would have some value for the theist. Without some restrictions and further limitations it is not of great value.
Another type of the personal experience argument was set forth by A.E. Taylor who used an analogy of art and music which has objectivity. Think of a concert in which many people attend. There are levels of response. The man who comes because his wife coerced him responds negatively. The musician probably has the best appreciation and response to the music, at the same time both critically and aesthetically.
Taylor argued that life is somewhat like the concert or beauty in nature. There is something "out there" that calls forth a response. Men differ in their responses, and because some do not see Him one is not justified in concluding that He does not exist. Aberrations there may be in religion, but the overwhelming repetition of religious experience throughout the ages lends support to the argument.
Objections exist and the following may be noted. (1) This argument lends support for all kinds of religious experience and is not easily limited to the theist. (2) The object of religious experience is never known. Is it really God that one experiences or some lesser being? (3) Theism would admit the importance and usefulness of experience in religion, but it would not be just any old experience that would be regarded as legitimate. It has been shown that hallucinogenic drugs produce a sense of awareness of the world around, but the production of the experiences does not validate the use of drugs. The drugs can destroy and bad religious experience can do likewise.
In the spirit of P.T. Forsyth, we can say that there is an authority for experience, but not authority in the experience. Forsyth meant that religious experience has its place, in relation to other things, but by itself it does not give authority for any conclusions about the truthfulness of God, gods, or whatever.
C. The Argument from Practical Use.
The argument from practical use is one that appears impressive at first, but then assumes some severe problems. The practical use argument is that belief in God works. It has a certain practicality that results do follow from belief. William James noted examples of people who were sick in body and mind, but through commitment and conversion they became well. The conclusion to be reached from this profound experience is that "God is real since he produces real effects."28 This is impressive when someone says, "I used to be . . ." and now I am a changed person. It is difficult to argue with that.
In a similar manner James argued that atheism has little help against pessimism, cynicism, and futility, whereas theism has much to offer in offsetting them.
The argument proves too much and raises serious questions for the theist. First, a change of thinking will help most people. If you believe you are capable and confident you will probably work better in that direction. If you believe you are incompetent, you may help yourself in that direction. Second, it proves the truth of many kinds of gods. The polytheistic Hindu gets psychological help in his piety as well as the monotheistic Muslim. There is some value received, or neither would do what they do. Are they worshipping the true God? That can't be decided on the basis of the argument. In light of these points it may be considered the most ambiguous of the arguments although it does make a point indicating that belief can affect how one lives.
D. The Wager.
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) set forth an argument that is unusual in its nature and compelling in many ways. It has also been a focal point of criticism based on oversight or ignorance.
Pascal is often classed as a fideist, that is, a person who says one cannot argue for God's existence, but one must accept it on faith. One statement of Pascal often quoted is the following:
If I bet that God is not:
1. and he is . . . eternal life is lost.
2. and he is not . . . nothing lost, except if a wild life has been chosen, which by its nature is self- destroying.
Therefore, the betting man, the reasonable man will bet on God.
Initially, Pascal indicated that life has its choices and it makes a difference now how one lives--affirming or negating life. This is seen at a deeper level with God. The Biblical God set forth the alternatives: life or death, therefore, choose life. Choose the way of life that affirms life. It is not an argument that proves the existence of God. It shows profoundly the choices and their relevance.
Some criticisms have been raised against the wager and one of the most common is the matter of side-bets. If one bets on God--which God? What about a side bet with Vishnu, Allah, as well as the Christian option? Pascal covered the matter of side bets in his comments on the nature of a true religion.31 Pascal placed before us three criteria for a true religion:
This leaves three other major options: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Judaism and Christianity have a unique relationship. Judaism offers a knowledge of God based upon God's self-revelation. Only God can reveal God. This is the meaning of Pascal's despair of reason. Judaism affirms that God has revealed himself, but the problem with Judaism is an interpretation problem: it has not been true to its own internal witness. Judaism spoke hopefully of a coming Messiah but did not recognize Him when he came. Pascal's Pensee 555 may be applied to Judaism:
The issue of Islam assumes another dimension. Islam claims to build on Judaism and Christianity. It presumes to be the successor to two religions. As long as it claims a continuity with the two religions, it has to reckon with the contradictions involved in the claim. There is nothing in Judaism or Christianity to call forth another religion beyond the Messiah. Judaism promised a Messiah, Christianity claims to be built on the Messiah; but Mohammed is neither a Messiah nor a promise of Christian fulfillment. When it became obvious to Muslim scholars that the Bible did not prophesy the coming of Mohammed, they then claimed that Jews and Christians conspired to corrupt the Scriptures deliberately. The Christian Scriptures speak with finality about God's last word to man in terms of the Incarnation. After God has come, anything else is an anti-climax.
This covers the major religions of the world in brief. As a matter of side-bets, then on Pascal's grounds there are none to be placed. The only real bet is on God-Incarnate. Only Christianity offers a mediator--a means of helping man to know the hidden God and experience redemption from his misery.
III. Revelational-Historical.
The idea of revelation is not usually considered by philosophers as having merit. When one considers the objections of philosophers later, this will be more evident. For now, we must consider the argument. It is one that is specially related to the Judaeo-Christian tradition but culminating in the person of Jesus, the Christ.
The claim is made by and for Jesus Christ that He is of the same nature of God, equal with God and come from God. His life is a parable of love, filled with deeds of kindness, healing and compassion. He raised the dead, gave sight to the blind, and did what no other person has done. In consistency with his claim of equality with God is the intense monotheism that he taught as well as was believed by the Jews of his day. Neither He nor they believed that every man is a sub-unit of the divine nature. He was condemned for his claim to equality with God and his claim of being the Messiah of Israel. The crucifixion took place and brought disappointment to his followers. If the death had been the end of the story no purpose would be achieved in these details. But three days later, the resurrection took place as Jesus foretold and out of this event Christianity was born. Jesus was seen after the resurrection by Mary Magdalene, then by the "other Mary," by Cleopas and another person on the road to Emmaus, Simon alone, then the ten together, then eight days later with the disciples now including Thomas who doubted before, then the seven beside the Sea of Galilee and to "above five hundred brethren," then to James, the last appearance at the Ascension, and finally at the appearance to the Apostle Paul.
The resurrection becomes the capstone of the Christian belief and it becomes the cardinal element in the claim that Jesus is the Son of God, or God Incarnate.
All of this is not limited to the era of Jesus. It is a climax of many things before Him. First, it is related to the messianic promise extending back through centuries of Old Testament history. The prophets speak of a coming Messiah. Jesus said of that claim: I am He.
Second, it is related to the acts of God in the Old Testament. Belief in God in Israel made a difference. God said, "Let there be . . ." light, earth, a people of God, an exodus from Egypt's slavery, a promised land, victory over the Canaanites, a kingdom of David, prophets to call forth judgement on the people's sin, and fulfillment of these prophetic denunciations, and let there come forth from Bethelehem a Messiah.
Third, in terms of Jewish apocalyptic belief in Jesus' day, the resurrection is the key for identifying the Messiah with God and in the Messiah is revealed God and his word.
Fourth, it is related to the miracles of Jesus. Miracles are not ethical principles, but historical events related to real people in real life situations. A miracle is a direct act of God that transcends the normal functions of nature. The resurrection is the beginning point of miracles and other miracles have their reference point to it. If it is true, they make sense. Miracles are projected in the Old Testament as well as the New. The plagues of Egypt, the crossing of the Sea, the parting of the Jordan, and other miracles took place at the right time by command of God. It would have been a falsifying situation if Moses had said: The Jordan will part, but it did not do so.
Fifth, the credibility of the resurrection and life of Jesus does not get lost in centuries after the fact when legendization can take place. In contrast to legendization processes, the documents about the life and resurrection of Jesus came into existence before 70 A.D. with many of these as early as ten years after the resurrection occurred. Compare this with the centuries after the life of Buddha and others. The enemies of Jesus were yet alive and could well contest the events.
These kinds of facts caused C.S. Lewis to conclude:
That is the argument in its summary. We now turn to the objections. The most critical objections to the idea of self-revelation come from Hume and Flew. Let's look at some of them.
First, the idea of a miracle. Hume has a celebrated essay on miracles in which he maintained "a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion."39 Flew himself avers:
The second objection is one that has relevance to all of the arguments. That issue is verification. Verification is the norm for Flew and others. It has the ring of scientific authority and brings the question into his framework: can you see, feel, touch, hear or taste God? If you cannot, you are talking nonsense.
One has to admit straight out that verification of God in this manner cannot be done. If verification is restricted in this manner, many other things are also meaningless. The intangibles--truth, love, justice and the realm of values--are all meaningless on the standard of empirical verification.
Verification is important for science, but even there it has its problems. Which theory of verification do we accept? There are several variations. If verification means reproducibility of an experiment, there is a variation of this in religion. A scientific experiment implies that everyone who wants to can follow certain steps and when this is done certain results will happen. In theology, the same holds true. If you follow certain steps and make certain commitments, then this will happen. By this means you will come to know God. This has been the underlying a basis of all mission programs in which people are converted in any religion. That is one kind of verification but it is not seeing God with the naked eye. On the other hand, there are things in science that are never seen, but are called verified.
Speaking about God is somewhat like speaking about pain. We can describe it publicly and even invent words about it. But we never see the pain. Yet we know what other people mean as a general rule when they talk about a pain here or there in their body. We can talk about God, share common experiences, and all these are meaningful, but we don't see God with the human eye. It is not the intention of the arguments to bring this about. The arguments give a reasonable indication that God is. But even the arguments are not enough, granting that they are valid without question. They may point in the direction of God, but we cannot be happy with an "inferred" God. What is needed is an encounter, a meeting with God.
IV. Conclusion.
The search for God is one of the most important issues of life. If God is, then it is important to seek out the most important Person in the universe. It may be obvious that the author's sentiments fall into the direction of the Christian faith. One basic reason for this lies in the Christian idea of Person. Anything less than a Person is not worthy of the search. God defined as energy, or force is impersonal and could not involve worship. God defined as Mover or First Cause does not demand any more than an intellectual nod of the head. But God as Person would be significant. If God is Personal, then it does not seem phantasy that He who creates would also communicate. The Judaeo-Christian faith as a view offers an aesthetically satisfying view of God. Only God as Person can reveal God.
Anselm. Proslogium. Translated by Sidney N. Deane. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1959.
Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas. Edited by A.C. Pegis. New York: The Modern Library, 1948.
Collins, James D. God in Modern Philosophy. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959.
Flew, Anthony. God and Philosophy. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1966.
James, William. Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Collier Books, 1961.